

THE US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, A MATERIALISTIC APPROACH: ACTIONS VERSUS RHETORIC

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ABSTRACT

According to the democratic peace proposition, democratic states should promote democracy in non-democratic states not only as a value but also as a genuine interest. During the last two decades, the G. W. Bush and Obama administrations made a group of initiatives and adopted various policies to promote democracy in Middle Eastern countries. The Middle East has been incorporated into these initiatives, and subsequently turned into a subject of the US drive for political reform. This paper argues that although the US tried to wrap its rhetoric proclamations about democracy with a normative character, its actions deemed to be totally materialistic or utilitarian. Democracy has never been an end for US foreign policy, but a means to an end. That's why it failed. This paper tries to explain this argument Grounded Theory method.

KEYWORDS: Democracy Promotion (DP), Middle East, Materialistic Theory, Normative Theory, Freedom Agenda & Strategic Patience

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INTRODUCTION

According to the democratic peace proposition, consolidated democracies shouldn't have solely a normative stand to promoting democracy around the world, but also a genuine strategic interest in spreading democracy to ensure their security and economic interests, Czempiel and Schraeder argued.¹ Normative and materialist theories tried to clarify the concept, mechanisms and goals of democracy promotion in different ways. Normative approach considers democracy promotion as a value. It is the degree to which democracy is built up as an all-inclusive standard or right that figures out which instruments are esteemed fitting. Ethically, democracy is a value and an end in itself (Frank, Thomas: 1994).² Democratically socialized citizens are used to settling their conflicts peacefully and in consensus-based mechanisms.³ Democracies externalize these 'liberal standards of peaceful resolution of conflicts. For a successful externalization, countries to which these liberal values are externalized must be cooperative and willing for transformation. This will pave the way for shared security and

¹Czempiel EO (1996b), Theory and strategy: Thoughts following Hajo Schmidt's Comment]. 3(1): 117–122.

Schraeder PJ (2003) The state of the art in international democracy promotion: Results of a joint European–North American research network. Democratization 20(2): 21–44.

² Frank, Thomas, (1994), The Emerging Democratic Entitlement, in D'Amato Anthony (ed), International Law Anthology, Cincinnati; Anderson, 367–373.

³Maoz Z and Russett B (1993) Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review 87(3): 624–638.

maximization of economic prosperity.⁴For Material theory, democracy promotion is conceived as an instrument among others to serve real that is material national interest; it will be implemented only if it helps serving the strategic interest of the state. Democracy is or is not promoted according to cost- benefit analysis. A thorough and closer look at the cost-benefit analysis one could anticipate from democracies uncovers, nevertheless, that there are also significant causes to stop engaging in democracy promotion (see Bueno de Mesquita and Downs, 2006: 631–2). The fundamental problem is that promoting democracy implies promoting democratization – that is, a complex and conflict-ridden process of political change. Systematic pressures and material power capabilities are the main factors that form foreign policy (Rose: 1998).⁵ Democracy promotion retreats when it collides with primary goals. The Materialist approach is almost based on utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is centered on rationality; rational states are interested in peace because wars make their interests at stake. However, it is rational to resort to coercion or war with non-democratic states to restore peace. Endeavours to globalize democratic regimes are effective and practical way to improve worldwide peace and security.⁶ Nevertheless, democracy promotion is rational under very specific conditions: good and short-term prospects of success, low risks, high asymmetries in relative power and selective incentives or closer international coordination (Shraeder: 2003).⁷This paper argues that although the US, in the rhetoric of its administrations, claimed the normative character of its democracy promotion, this character deemed to be totally materialistic or utilitarian. This was very obvious in the US democracy promotion in the Middle East.

TYPE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH METHOD

This research is a descriptive and analytical research. It describes democracy promotion related actions under the sequent US administrations starting from G.W. Bush to the present administration with a more focus on G.W. Bush and Obama administration's policies and actions. Then, the researcher analyses the relationship between the rhetoric of these two administrations and their policies and actions to measure the compatibility between them. The researcher also uses the Grounded Theory Method where factual or grounded data are collected and then analyzed. These relevant data segments are considered empirical indicators for theoretical concepts. The researcher finds that this method could facilitate understanding the argument of this research, the materialistic nature of US democracy promotion in the Middle East.

THE US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

With the end of WWII, the US considered the Middle East an indispensable domain of interest motivated by the existence of oil and a strategic ally in Israel. In addition, the Middle East is of a crucial geo-strategic importance to the US. The Middle East embodies a sort of dilemma for the US; the paradox of sustaining stability in the region and the desire to transform authoritarian regimes into democratic regimes. Moreover, the 11th of September attacks, the emergence of terrorist organizations in this region, Al Qaeda, ISIS and related terrorist groups and the recent Arab Spring revolutions put the American strategic interests in this region at stake which made democratization a necessity. Democracy promotion has for some time been a key element of US foreign policy, in view of the conviction that democratization abroad adds to accomplishing American security and economic objectives. Various initiatives were launched by US administrations from

⁴Risse-Kappen T (1995) Democratic peace – warlike democracies: A social constructivist interpretation of the democratic peace. *European Journal of International Relations* 1(4): 491–517.

⁵Rose, G., (1998), *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*, review Article, *World Politics*, 51(1) pp. 144-172.

⁶Wolff, Jonas, Wurm Iris,(2011), *Towards A Theory of External Democracy Promotion: A Proposal for Theoretical Classification*. Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt. 77-96

⁷

the early 1990s to promote democracy in the Middle East. Even though these initiatives go back to many decades, democracy promotion in the Middle East has been a priority since 2001, as a ramification of the 11th of September.

All through the twenty-first century the US has tried to adjust its customary national security interests, while likewise trying to advance the long haul change of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) towards democracy in light of liberal values. US democracy promotion always starts with a rhetoric focusing on the idea that democracy is a value and the US has a mission to spread it and that democracy secures human rights and fosters economic prosperity; however, this rhetoric is abandoned when US national interest and security are exposed to a potential threat. Markakis argued that the objectives of US democracy promotion are twofold, first, the maintenance of stability in the targeted countries as this stability impacts directly political, economic and military interest of the US second, the achievement of hegemony in Gramscian sense, “the US has sought to strategically penetrate not just the state, but civil society and from therein exercises control”.⁸ Robinson argues that the purpose of democracy promotion is not to suppress but to penetrate and conquered civil societies, co-opt them and from therein integrate subordinate classes and national groups into a hegemonic social order”.⁹The following parts will shed light on US democracy promotion initiatives made by the sequent US administration starting from George W. Bush to the present Administration under Donald Trump; however it will be preceded by a historical background.

Historical Background

Democracy promotion has profound roots in the US governments. From its commencement, the founding fathers held that America is a remarkable nation based on a principle that humans have indispensable rights. Thought this was an inner shelter for the founding fathers with the end goal to cement the rule of democracy. Democracy promotion was demonstrated in President Woodrow Wilson’s call for the League of Nation to vindicate the principles of peace and justice against autocratic power.¹⁰On April 2, 1917, Wilson went before a joint session of Congress to seek a Declaration of War against Germany in order that the world be made safe for democracy. Later, after the US developed as a worldwide power, the idea permeated to the outside approach at the time of President Roosevelt. From that time forward, democracy has been dependably a common word among American presidents.¹¹In his speech on the 29th of December 1940, Franklin Roosevelt declared we must be the great arsenal of democracy; for us this is a crisis as genuine as war itself.¹²Harry Truman, on the 20th of January 1949 said democracy alone can supply the vitalizing power to mix the people groups of the world into triumphant activity, against their human oppressors, as well as against their old adversaries yearning, hopelessness, and sadness¹³. Dwight Eisenhower, on the 17th of January, 1961 declared America's leadership and glory depend, not just upon our unmatched material advancement, wealth and military quality, however on how we utilize our influence in light of a legitimate concern for world harmony and human improvement.¹⁴ President Jimmy Carter said a strong nation, like a strong person, can stand to be delicate, firm, astute, and limited; it can stand to stretch out some assistance to other

⁸ Markakis, Dionysius, (2012), *US Democracy Promotion in The Middle East, The Pursuit of Hegemony*. (a thesis submitted to the department of international relations of the London School of Economics, October, 2012)

⁹ Robinson, Williams, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention and Hegemony*, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

¹⁰ Dalacoura, Katerina, (2005), *Democracy and Its Critics*, *International Affairs*, 81/5: pp. 963-979.

¹¹ Heydari, Mohammad, (2011), *The Nature of US Democracy Promotion Policy: Reality versus Illusion The Case of Iraq*, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, pp.110-121.

¹² <https://www.azquotes.com/quote>

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

people.¹⁵ President Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) was the first president to genuinely position the philosophy of democracy as a guiding principle of US foreign policy in the conviction that freedom could overcome the evil empire, the Soviet Union.¹⁶ The Reagan administration along these lines, detailed the methodology and strategy of democracy promotion, setting up a significant part of the framework of democracy as the National Endowment for democracy (NED) and executing reforms in various nations, for instance, the Philippines, Chili and Poland.¹⁷ As Carl Gershman leader of the NED, expressed in 1986 " In a universe of cutting edge correspondence and detonating information, it is not any more conceivable to depend entirely on power to promote stability and protect the national security. Influence is progressively imperative and the United States must improve its ability to induce by creating systems for contacting individuals at a wide range of levels.¹⁸ Greshman, using Joseph Nye's concept and analysis of the soft power,¹⁹ upheld the utility of democracy promotion for the US in order to improve its ability to persuade.²⁰ President George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) adopted a more practical position as during his term of office about 109 countries were incorporated in democracy promotion programs. The Clinton administration formulated an explicit policy of enlargement of the world's community of democracies.²¹ It was going to "segregate [non-democracies] carefully, militarily, financially, and innovatively," as Clinton's National Security Adviser Lake put it. Anthony Lake identified the four pillars of enlargement: first, the US ought to fortify the network of principal market democracy — including its own — which comprises the center from which enlargement is proceeding. Second, the US should encourage, enhance and support new democracy and market economies, where conceivable, particularly in countries of special significance and opportunity. Third, the US should counter the animosity — and bolster the liberalization — of states hostile to democracy and markets. Fourth, the US has to seek after its philanthropic plan by providing aid, as well as by attempting to encourage democracy and market economic aspects flourish in areas of most noteworthy humanitarian concern.²² Promoting freedom and democracy and ensuring human rights the world over have for some time been focal parts of US foreign policy. In view of these objectives, the United States looks to: first, advance democracy as a way to accomplish security, strength, and welfare for the whole world; second, help recently established democracies in applying democratic principles; third, advocates the world over to build up lively democratic systems in their own nations; and fourth, distinguish and impugn regimes that deny their subjects the privilege to pick their representatives and leaders in elections that are free, fair, and straightforward. In any case, democracy promotion has been one of the avocations of US administrations for intercession abroad, and that is American foreign policy style since World War I.²³ Researchers, for example, John Ikenberry and Tony Smith have contended that democracy promotion has been a settled subject in both Democrat and Republican agenda and the identified of America's role in the

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Markakis, Dionysius, *ibid.* p. 12.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Gershman, C., *Fostering Democracy Abroad: The Role of the National Endowment for Democracy*, American Political Science Foundation Convention, 29/8/1986.

¹⁹ Joseph Nye, (2005), *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* Public Affairs. the originator of the concept, initially set out three primary sources of soft power as he developed the concept. Nye's three pillars of soft power are: political values, culture, and foreign policy.

²⁰ Gershman, C. *Ibid.*

²¹ Slantchey, Branislav L., (2016), *US Foreign Policy: Democratic Enlargement*, Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego.

²² Anthony Lake. "From Containment to Enlargement," September 21, 1993. Speech delivered at Johns Hopkins University. <http://fas.org/news/usa/1993/usa-930921.htm>, accessed July 24, 2014

²³ Wittes, Tamara Cofman (2008). *Freedom's unsteady march: America's role in building Arab democracy*. The Brookings Institution

world.²⁴

THE US DEMOCRACY PROMOTION UNDER GEORGE W. BUSH: THE FREEDOM AGENDA

The G.W. Bush administration's rationale of democracy promotion in the Middle East was an immediate result of justifying why the terrorists' assaults on September 11, 2001 happened. For the G.W. Bush administration, an absence of political and economic liberty in the Middle East permitted terrorists organizations, for example, al-Qaeda to radicalize distanced people. Throughout its terms of office the Bush administration made reference to the advancement of democracy itself or its components in more than 100 speeches and media. Bush Administration viewed democracy as a system of government that must prevail all over the world, "the ideal of democracy is universal, (Rice 2005a). A little more than six decades prior, the eventual fate of freedom appeared to be distressing... The United States will keep on supporting the development of democratic movements and establishments in each country (Proclaimed by Stephen Hadley, the National Security Adviser in his speech on Human Rights week(2006). President Bush reported that the US would seek after a "forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East since neediness, stagnation, and absence of women's rights in the Middle East is not the disappointments of a culture or a religion – it is the result of political and economic doctrines" (Bush, 2003). Also, the Bush administration saw democracy promotion itself as an essence of national interest "As long as the Middle East remains a location of oppression and gloom and outrage, it will keep on delivering men and developments that threaten the well-being of America and our companions.... We will defy the foes of change, go up against the allies of terror and expect a higher standard from our companions" (Bush 2004). Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Cairo proclaimed that for a long time, my nation, the United States, sought after stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East and we accomplished neither of them. Presently, we are taking an alternate course. We are supporting the aspirations of all peoples" (Rice 2005, Cairo). The various objectives of G. W. The Bush administration was allocated under the label of the "Freedom Agenda". The aim behind of the Freedom Agenda was to utilize the full range of means accessible to the United States for the progression of human freedom and human nobility through compelling effective democracy. Dalacoura argued that since 2001, US democracy promotion in the Middle East has been sought on different levels, none of which could be handled separately. The first level comprises policy initiatives which include some projects to support political reform and civil society organizations, the second level has been traditional and public diplomacy through state officials and the third level is demonstrated in the interventionist US foreign policy epitomized in the invasion of Iraq.²⁵ It is with that strategy in mind that the Freedom Agenda was initially institutionalized through initiatives such as the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the aim behind MEPI's projects was to 'widen' the US scope to deal with Middle East change, for example, by tending to issues around the 'freedom from dread' and "freedom from need" featured in the 2002 UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDR, 2002), the Middle East Free Trade Agreement (MEFTA), President Bush contended that over the globe, free markets and exchange have helped crush neediness, what's more, shown people the propensities for freedom. In this way, I propose the foundation of a US - Middle East unhindered commerce region inside 10 years, to bring the Middle East into an extending hover of chance, to give hope to the 1 population who live in that region ... By supplanting debasement and self-managing, with free markets and reasonable laws, the population of the Middle East will develop in well-faire and freedom, (Bush 2003b) and the Broader Middle East

²⁴ Smith, Tony and Ikenberry, John (2000), —Introduction, I in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts, Ed. by Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi (Oxford University Press,)

²⁵ Dalacoura, Katerina, (2005), US Democracy Promotion in The Arab Middle Since 2011 September 2001: A Critique., International Affairs, Vol.81, No.5, pp. 963-979

and North Africa Agreement (BMENA) which intended to create a Greater Middle East motivated by a multilateral goal of promoting democracy, good governance, establishing knowledge-based societies and expanding economic opportunities for MENA.²⁶ The objectives are to eradicate terrorism, promote regional stability, promote regional economic growth and remove tyranny and create peace.²⁷ Condoleezza Rice, the Secretary of State, on January 18, 2005 announced three top priorities for her administration's diplomacy: To start with, we will join the network of democracies in building a universal framework that depends on shared qualities and the rule of law. Second, we will fortify the network of democracies to battle the dangers to our common security and remove the frustrations that encourages terror. Third, we will spread freedom and democracy all through the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set for America on the planet and is the extraordinary mission of American diplomacy today.²⁸ George W Bush stressed the significance of democracy in his memoir, *Decision Points*, in such a way that "We are driven, by occasions and good judgment, to one end: The survival of freedom in our territory progressively relies upon the achievement of freedom in different grounds. The best way for harmony in our reality is the extension of freedom in the whole world. ... So it is the arrangement of the United States to look for and bolster the development of democratic developments and organizations in each country and culture, with a definitive objective of closure oppression in our world." (Bush, 2010).

The aforementioned rhetoric of G.W Bush and his administration about democracy promotion in the Middle East magnified hopes and aspirations about a new democratic and economically prosperous Middle East. However, rhetoric collided with reality. The Bush administration made critical steps in putting democracy promotion on global and regional agenda, and disbursed large amounts of money up to different nongovernmental groups seeking after democracy promotion activities. However, these funds did not reach the groups that most required them or could put that cash to its best utility. Moreover, a significant number of the discussions and working groups progressed by the Bush administration turned out to be essentially talking groups, a place to propel the standards and defenses for democracy promotion, yet not a wellspring of solid activity towards the realization of those standards.²⁹ The cases of Iraq and Afghanistan show clearly that rhetoric is a mere group of shiny words which if collide with reality, they fade away. Bush invasion of Iraq was advocated by Saddam's ownership of weapons of mass decimation and misleading interfaces among Saddam and Al-Qaeda. The truth is that there were a number of other aims behind the rationale for the invasion. These objectives are the US' willingness to safeguard its interest in the Middle East, access to oil and the security of its major ally in the region, Israel. Bush Administration viewed the invasion of Iraq a special chance to re-establish the Middle East security identified with the old policy of containment and solidify the projection of the US influence in the Middle East. The US wanted to isolate Iraq from Iran and Syria as a part of the axis of evil and to establish US bases in Iraq instead of Saudi Arabia.³⁰ Failure to find weapons of mass demolition and Saddam-Al-Qaeda ties, Bush legitimized invasion of Iraq by the name of advancing democracy and the start that oust of Saddam fascism would prompt another variant of a fair domino impact all through the region. So democracy promotion turned into the tertiary objective for the invasion of Iraq.³¹ Would Saddam's removal set the region aflame? asked Richard Perle, Chairman of Defense Policy Board Advisory; he continued, it appeared at any rate as likely

²⁶ Alessandri Emiliano, et al.(2015), U.S Democracy Promotion From Bush to Obama, The German Marshall Fund of The United States, University of Warwick, UK.

²⁷ Hassan, Osman Ali. (2009), George W. Bush, September 11th and the Rise of the Freedom Agenda in US-Middle East Relations: A Constructivist Institutional Approach., University of Birmingham Research Archive.

²⁸ Heydari, Mohammad, Ibid.

²⁹ Glen, Patrick J. (2011), Democracy Promotion in the Obama Administration: An Opportunity to Match Action to Rhetoric, Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-31

³⁰ Markakis, Dionysius, ibid

³¹ Heydari, Mohammad, Ibid

that Saddam's substitution by a democratic Iraqi regime would open the path to a highly stable and harmonious region.³² This mirrored a central conviction that the effective presentation of liberal democratic political principles and free market economy in Iraq, would in the end lead to germination over the region and in the process achieve hegemony in the Middle East.³³ The intention of the Bush administration's strategy of democracy promotion is elites based strategy; these elites would be an influential intermediaries between the Iraqi's people and the US transformational process in Iraq. These elites would tighten their control over the Iraqi political and civil society to pave the way for the US hegemony over Iraq; the goal is to establish a stable political order that secures and sustain a reliable supplier of oil, investment and a platform for international political and economic intervention in the Middle East.³⁴ The advancement of elites- based democracy in Iraq, as a part of a long haul quest for hegemony in both the nation and the more extensive locale, consolidated a scope of changes tending to the Iraqi economy, political framework and civil society. This elite-based democracy would lead to transforming the Iraqi economy from a centralized and state-monopolized economy under Saddam Hussein to a capitalist and free market economy which is the foundation of democracy. Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Authority, declared that a free economy and a free people go hand in hand; economic freedom is intertwined with political freedom.³⁵ Concerning political framework, President G.W Bush identified the general parameters of US's democracy promotion in Iraq. This promotion consolidates peace, security, stability, the power and will of free people, women empowerment and encouraging political participation for all citizens without discrimination.³⁶ A major objective of the US strategy of democracy promotion in Iraq was to found an active civil society with a focus on the areas of civic education, women's advocacy, human rights and anti-corruption to consolidate the role of civil society in developing qualified civil society organizations. As Andrew Natsios, USAID's Administrator argued that if a new democratic regime is to replace an autocratic regime, it must be built from the bottom up and becomes a part of the regular operations in Iraqi society.³⁷ The economic, political and civil society reforms implemented by the Bush's Administration were conceived as parts of the US strategy of democracy promotion based on securing oil, investment and the security of Israel on the one hand and paving the way for the US hegemony not only in Iraq but also on the Middle East as a whole. However, in a loosely divided country, after the removal of Saddam Hussein, the US' strategy was confronted by a rapidly intensified insurgency and massive pressures from the different sects, Shi'ites and Sunnis, which forced the US to transfer authority to a weak interim government and Iraq turned into chaos. In parliamentary elections, in which Ahmed Chalabi, the US ally in Iraq, was expected to win failed and the Iraqi assembly was dominated by the United Iraqi Alliance, a broad-based Shiite electoral coalition.³⁸ Moreover, endeavour to draft a new constitution based on the US' version of democracy failed. The economic array wasn't far from this failure; economic reforms plan initiated by the US programs weren't supported and the free instituted market fell down. At the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), no American firm or

³² Break, Clean.(1996), A New Strategy For Securing The Realm, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies.

³³ Markakis, Dionysius, *ibid*

³⁴ Robinson, W. (2004), What to Expect From US Democracy Promotion In Iraq, *New Political Science* , vol.26, No. 3, p. 446.

³⁵ Looney, R. (2003), The Neoliberal Model's Planned Role in Iraq's Economic Transition, *Middle East Journal* , vol.57, No.4, p. 574.

³⁶ Bush, G.W., " Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, <http://www.ned.org>.

³⁷ Nastios, A. (2005), Democratic Opportunity and the Islamic World, <http://www.usaid.gov>

³⁸ Dodge, T.(2006), The Sardinian , The Texan and The Tikriti: Gramsci, The Comparative Autonomy of The Middle Eastern State and Regime Change in

transnational oil corporations made a substantial investment in Iraq.³⁹ Moreover, the aspired civil society fell in the ethnic and sectarian strife which prevailed in Iraq. "We were busy trying to build a Jeffersonian democracy and a capitalist economy that we neglected the big picture; we squandered an enormous opportunity and we didn't realize it until everything blew up in our faces."⁴⁰

In Afghanistan the situation was significantly different from the iron hold of Saddam Hussein to an extremely ethnically divided society having Sunni Tajiks, Sunni Pathans, Shiite Hazaras, Sunni Uzbeks and even Ismailis. Albeit ethnic assorted variety all by itself may not block democratic transformation, a background marked by ethnically-based complaints or of regime preferentialism toward one of the ethnicities has regularly been a hindrance to smooth democratization.⁴¹ Afghanistan has been torn by war since the late 1970s. A past filled with viciousness and ethnic complaints tormented the nation, against the master Soviet Tajiks by both Tajik and Pashtuns, among the Mujahidin themselves after they came to control in 1992, between them too, the generally Pashtun Taliban since 1994, and afterward between Pashtun guerrillas also, US and NATO powers and their partner, the new Afghanistan National Army, after 2001. A significant part of the democracy promotion endeavors of US are connected to the reproduction and building/revamping of Afghan state. Disrupted by the 9/11 attacks, G.W. Bush and his administration portrayed Afghanistan as the cradle and incubator of terrorism and directly targeted the Taliban regime as the base and source of terrorism. A conference was held in Bonn, Germany on November 26 to address the future of Afghanistan and to construct legitimate and representative governance.⁴² USAID programs started in Afghanistan in 2002; these programs were implemented in a top-down approach by developing the capacity of key governmental institutions, executive, legislative and judicial and providing technical assistance and training to Afghani parliamentary representatives and civil-services involved officials to facilitate the transition process. Moreover, local governance is supported and developed through various projects and programs that were directed to sub-national governmental institutions and anti-corruption assistance is provided in the Afghan Anti-Corruption Agency. Although these programs and projects were implemented, they weren't implemented in a sort of coherent strategy that is assessed to measure the degree of improvement and which entails that democracy promotion was done in a routine and non-oriented manner. In addition the transition wasn't inclusive; it was directed to the government, Karazai government, and allied groups the situation which led to a large scope of insurgency by the sullen and underground Taliban group and dissents.

The case of Egypt as a US strategic ally took another road. Egypt under Hosni Mubarak was considered by the US an authoritarian state, where repressive measures were regularly used towards any kind of opposition. In addition, freedom and respect of human rights hardly existed. However the US adopted a different approach in Egypt, different from the coercive approach adopted in Iraq and Afghanistan. G.W. Bush, in the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in (2003) stated that "The great and proud nation of Egypt has shown the way towards peace in the Middle East and now should show the way towards democracy in the Middle East." This kind of decent words were directed to Egypt implies the strategic significance of Egypt for the United States. Egypt plays an important role in protecting US security interests through maintaining peace with Israel, countering anti-American Islamic fundamentalism

³⁹ Paul, D., (2007), *The Siren Songs of Geopolitics: Towards A Gramscian account of The Iraq War*, Millennium Journal of International studies, Vol.36, No.1, P. 59.

⁴⁰ Markakis, Dionysius, *ibid*

⁴¹ Mark R. Beissinger, (2008), "A New Look at Ethnicity and Democratization," *Journal of Democracy* 19. 3 85-97.

⁴² Adel, Enayatullah, (2015), *Promoting Democracy in Afghanistan The top-down or bottom-up approaches of European Union and United States Qualitative Text Analysis*, Södertörns University

and assisting the US in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran.⁴³ Moreover, although Egypt opposed the US invasion of Iraq, Egypt assisted in the US efforts to stabilize the country and in the US war against terrorism. Considering the strategic significance of Egypt, Bush Administration's approach towards Egypt oscillated between criticism and pressure. Under G. W. Bush administration, the relationship between the US and Egypt wasn't harmonious. The invasion of Iraq, the chaos which prevailed in the country afterwards and the destabilized region as a whole negatively impacted the Egyptian government. This was magnified by G. W. Bush stress on political reform in the Middle East highlighting the case of Egypt. Margaret Scobey, the US ambassador in Egypt under Bush administration described Egypt as "a stubborn and recalcitrant ally". As a result, the Egyptian government took some cynical measures, for example, when Rice cancelled its visit to Cairo in February (2005) due to the arrest of Ayman Nour, a political activist. Mubarak declared modification in Egypt constitution, which permitted the participation of a number of candidates in the presidential elections for the first time in Egypt. Mubarak's step was perceived as a compromise between the US demands and Egypt's status quo. In these elections, Mubarak got 88%, which gave an implication that the elections were neither fair nor transparent. Another example was the parliament elections, November (2005), which didn't meet the international standards, although it allowed the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned movement, to win a record of 88/454 seat in the People's Assembly. Although these measures indicated a sort of Egypt's compliance to the US pressure and marked a slightly active created political awareness, they didn't push democracy forward in Egypt. Although President G.W. Bush threatened to cut financial aid to Egypt under Mubarak, the existing \$ two billion in annual economic and military assistance continued.

The purported freedom agenda of the Bush organization was a disappointment of both conceptualization and Practice—an excessively militarized way to promote democratic reform and an exertion that failed to coordinate the rhetoric of President Bush with actions on the ground that reflected democratic principles. Thus, the Middle East has not turned out to be more democratic just on account of US activities than it was in the earlier decade. In Iraq, where the US military expelled a ruthless despot from power, the present decision makers have shown a frail regard for human rights and the rule of law.⁴⁴ Additionally, an accurate analysis of the Bush administration's Freedom Agenda brings into inquiry its consistency as a general strategy. It was broadly recognized that, as opposed to being supported by a rational methodology, there was in actuality an absence of key direction that drove Freedom Agenda establishments to finance democratization projects in a conflated manner.⁴⁵ The victory of Hamas in (2006) in the Palestinian parliamentary elections and the US non-recognition of the legitimate and election based victory demonstrated the dilemma between democracy promotion and the US' interests during G.W. Bush tenure. Moreover, the US double standard pattern of democracy promotion. The US adopted two patterns with regard to democracy promotion in Arab Countries, one with the US' friends and one with its foes'. The US had put pressure on its friend Arab countries, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar and Morocco by recommending political and democratic reform. Concerning the US' foes, the pattern has been more forceful; in countries like Syria, Lybia and Palestine, the US pursued democracy promotion in consistency with security objectives such as confronting terrorism and protection of Israel. In addition, although the Bush administration argued that democracy promotion and security concerns is not an either/ or choice and that democracy is complementary to security. In reality, a lot of contradictions occurred; the war on terror has caused a lot of restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, many

⁴³ Hawthorne, Amy, (2014), Getting Democracy Promotion Right in Egypt, RafikHarriri Center for The Middle East.

⁴⁴ Katulis, Brian, (2009), Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and the Obama Administration, The Century Foundation, Inc. www.tcf.org

⁴⁵ Hawthorne, Amy (2005) Statement of Amy Hawthorne Independent Middle East Democracy Promotion Specialist. Hearing on 'Redefining Boundaries: Political Liberalization in the Arab World'.

Arab governments, in the name of fighting terrorism have increased anti-democratic violations and the US made no concern about this as if the war on terrorism led these governments to more authoritarianism than democracy.⁴⁶

The difficulties for Middle East democracy stay extensive. Yet, moving far from democracy promotion would be an error for long-term US core interests in stability and welfare in the region. The United States, under the Obama administration, ought to do its best to progress political transformation in this troublesome region of the world, with more accentuation on practical strides to improve better governance and the rule of law, and reduce the arrogant rhetoric that makes democracy promotion seem like a crusade; the most vital advance that the United States and its institutions can do to propel human rights and democracy in the Middle East is to try to do what it says, lead by example and guarantee that its activities coordinate the democratic principles and standards it looks to progress in the Middle East.⁴⁷ A lot of recommendations were put on the table for Obama, the new president and his administrations concerning democracy promotion in the Middle; however, a lot of pressures and priorities were also dominating the new administration concerning the US's interests and democracy promotion in the Middle East.

The US Democracy Promotion under Barack Obama: The doctrine of the "Strategic Patience"

Actually, the G.W. Bush administration laid establishments for what the Obama administration has come to call "the long game", which ascertains "collaborations" and "sustainability" in its endeavour to make the long term conditions for freedom, peace and welfare.

As President Barack Obama enters office in 2009, his administration confronted an overwhelming number of difficulties in the Middle East, including bringing an end to the Iraq war, reversing the negative image about the US in the region, tending to different uncertain tracks of the Arab-Israeli strife and building up a successful reaction to Iran's atomic program and local aspirations, confrontation with terrorist groups, defying Islamist political radicalism and managing internal conflicts in a few key nations. In the meantime, rising security dangers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India may shift US consideration and assets from the Middle East to South Asia.⁴⁸ A group of priorities has been initiated for Obama and his administration to promote democracy in the region and at the same time secures the US security and interests. These priorities include the followings: take tangible steps to restore US credibility through actions not words. The US should, first, create a collaborative network with other cooperative international actors, the EU and international organizations, in its pursuance to promote internationally recognized democratic values and norms rather than act individually as a self-interested crusade, second, functional diplomacy must be adopted to address and settle regional and intranational conflicts as this will lead to peaceful environments and make them ready for democracy, third, developing a coherent and streamlined strategy for promoting democracy and supporting good governance and fourth adopt positive conditionality towards countries that make forward steps towards democracy by facilitating and supporting their accession to international organizations and providing financial aids and support.⁴⁹ Under the Obama administration, democracy promotion had significantly a lower profile. Obama approach was depicted as an endeavour to both reset strategy and separate the president from the legacy of his antecedent.⁵⁰ With regards to harmed US pro-democratic credibility and inauspicious worldwide democracy prospects, President Obama and his senior foreign policy team recognized a critical

⁴⁶ Dalacoura, Katerina, *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Katulis, Brian, *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Katulis, Brian, *ibid.*

⁴⁹ *ibid.*

⁵⁰ Snider, Erin, A, Faris, David, M, (2011), *The Arab Spring : US Democracy in Egypt*, Middle East Policy, vol. 18, No.3, pp. 49-62.

need to re-calibrate US democracy strategy. In 2011 President Obama spread out a striking vision of future American arrangement toward the Middle East. Talking at the State Department, he lauded the wave of political change clearing over the area and swore that it will be the approach of the United States to advance reform over the region and to help advances to democracy. In blend with his 2009 discourse in Cairo, in which he apparently laid the preparation for a new relationship between the United States and the Arab world, Obama raised desires for a dynamic methodology toward democracy in the area. Obama appeared to be particularly reluctant to put the United States in the situation of forcing itself politically on different nations, telling others what to do, or accepting that the United States has the appropriate responses for all questions.⁵¹

Semi-Realist Pragmatism

During the first half of 2009, the negative impacts of his predecessor's Freedom Agenda caused Barack Obama to lag behind from the issue, reduce US rhetoric on America's liberal and democratic model abroad, try to rebuild America's democratic standing. Adding to this de-accentuation, President Obama attempted a more extensive exertion to enhance US discretionary commitment with an assortment of nondemocratic governments, in Iran, Russia, and other hostile and semi-hostile states.⁵² However, in the second half of 2009, a more active engagement on democracy promotion was observed. This wasn't a sharp shift away from the previous cautious standing; nevertheless, it occurred due to criticism that was directed to Obama administration, first, to set aside democracy promotion in a strategic and a highly important domain of US interests, the Middle East, second, disclaim the US commitment to democracy, human rights and the role of Law. Moreover, the breakthroughs in Tunisia, Egypt and other Arab countries in (2011) pushed Obama administration to confront its most imperative and prominent democracy challenge. While the development of political change in the Arab world could be a decisive issue for the region, it additionally compromises to imperil different American economic and security interests. The US reaction has been correspondingly blended, joining support for democratization where it appears to be happening with an ability to proceed with close ties with apparently stable tyrants. This pragmatic position appeared to observers a retreat to realism. This shift appeared slightly in Obama and his administration rhetoric. In his speech in Cairo university, Egypt in June (2009) Obama said "People yearn for certain things: the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed." In the United Nations General Assembly in September (2009), Obama said "the United States will never waver in our efforts to stand up for the right of people everywhere to determine their own destiny." Hillary Clinton, Secretary of the State, in Georgetown University in December (2009), said "This Administration, like others before us, will promote, support and defend democracy, we will relinquish neither the word nor the idea to those who have used it too narrowly or to justify unwise policies."

The Long Game: A Group of Loosely Collected Initiatives

To show an active involvement in democracy promotion, the Obama administration started their discussion about formulating what has been known "The Long Game Approach" for the support of democracy. This approach would be more inclined towards indirect and soft measures rather than hard measures and multilateralism and consensus building rather than unilateralism. This approach comprises a group of undertakings, first, empowering a more noteworthy support for rising democracy emphasizing the role of civil society organizations in the democratic transition, secondly, encouraging multilateral international efforts to commitment to open government, which includes government responsibility and citizen

⁵¹ Carothers, Thomas, (2012), *Democracy Policy Under Obama Revitalization or Retreat?* Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 1-43

⁵² Ibid

participation, third, promoting international cooperation on anti-corruption, fourth, engagement with civil society organizations in non-democratic states and finally, establish a development related democracy approach in these countries.⁵³

In the process of implementation, the Obama administration confronted a critical question: Should democracy promotion is a top priority in its agenda which includes other priorities, US interests? The answer of this question was vividly demonstrated in real actions taken by the Obama administration as democracy was downplayed in many countries for the sake of US interests. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Obama administration keeps up cordial and friendly relations with undemocratic governments in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan for different advantages, particularly calculated collaboration relating to the war in Afghanistan and access to oil and gas. Another example of downplaying democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the discovery of oil had largely oriented the administration to reinforce good relations with the governments of Ethiopia, Rwanda, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda. After Obama brought the issue up in his June 2009 Cairo discourse, he let it slide, due to the surfeit of different distractions and the inclination of his foreign policy advisors for the evident straightforwardness and the solace of the commonplace default method of supporting dictators as a byproduct of assistance on different economic and security matters.

Concerning the Middle East the issue wasn't different. US interests exceed in significance any priority. In the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, the major concern for Obama and his administration is to pull out American troops from this muddy mess. When Obama visited Iraq in 2008, as a presidential candidate, he told commanding General, David Petraeus that "the US needed to fast withdraw its troops from Iraq as Afghanistan is the central front in the war on terror." By being elected, President Obama sent a signal to the world that the US democracy approach will be renewed. President Barack Obama himself proclaimed in 2011 as he withdrew the last American troops, "We're leaving behind a sovereign, stable and self-reliant Iraq."⁵⁴ In reality, this wasn't the truth; Iraq tumbled in a civil war due to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's policies, a Shiite, who was the one who blew it since American troops left him fully in charge. Maliki put his support behind Iran, the area's largest Shiite power, which was very ready to help his campaign against the Sunnis. Obama left Iraq to lurch along individually as he ramped up the "good war" in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, where security conditions keep on falling apart basically on account of the Taliban, Afghans have endured record losses, and US military fatalities have significantly expanded under Obama's supervision. The ascent of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) in Iraq and Syria has kept on dominating Obama's war in Afghanistan even after the group set up its as yet developing branch in the South Asian country. In his memoir *Decision Points*, G. W. Bush stated that Afghanistan was "Unfinished business," adding that the push to change the nation into a steady democratic had "ended up being more terrible than I expected." In any case, the war found a successor willing to invest more energy and assets, including human capital, into the progressing exertion.⁵⁵ After eight years, US military fatalities in the war have more than quadrupled from 558 under Bush to 2,247 under Obama, as per Pentagon figures. There were 1,689 US military passings in Afghanistan under Obama, and assume that makes up in excess of 75 percent of every single American casualty since the war began in October 2001. The quantity of US military

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Gergen, David, Did Obama botch the endgame in Iraq? <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/27/opinion/gergen-katz-iraq/index.html>

⁵⁵ Mora, Edwin, (2017), Obama's 'Good War': Afghanistan in Ruins Eight Years Later, <https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2017/01/19/>

wounds has expanded more than 7-fold, from 2,702 under Bush to 20,237 currently, as per Pentagon figures. Moreover, more than \$115 billion was provided in the form of reconstruction of Afghanistan. US government policies concerned with reconstruction may have powered the development of the endemic and boundless defilement in Afghanistan and supported militant gatherings focusing on American troopers. In spite of vows to haul American troops out of Afghanistan when he leaves office, the President chose to change course a year ago and keep up around 8,400 troops in 2017.⁵⁶

At the point when Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak remained consistent with his authoritarian form by controlling and undermining Egypt's 2010 parliamentary decisions, the Obama administration turned a blind eye. At the point when dissents broke out in January 2011, President Obama and his administration at first held to the possibility that Mubarak could endure the dissents and direct a reform procedure. On January 25, Hillary Clinton told journalists that "our appraisal is that the Egyptian government is stable and is searching for approaches to react to the genuine needs and interests of the Egyptian citizens."⁵⁷ After the toppling of President Mubarak, the aspired transition to democracy didn't grow up. The sequent interim governments and the Muslim Brotherhood had set aside the real transition to democracy and have surpassed political opposition. Formal US response to these excesses has been muted. In Libya, the Obama administration was highly motivated to participate in the unfolding political transformation. Although the US was unwilling to intervene in the Libyan civil war, Obama administration encouraged by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the European declaration of the no fly zone due to the Qaddafi's crushing of the rebels, supported the UN resolution (1973) to use force to protect the civilians. Moreover, it played an important role in the NATO intervention and managed to destroy Libyan air defenses and launch about 400 air strikes.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the administration proved unwilling to make a noteworthy responsibility to support political transformation, due to a great extent to the congressional displeasure about the apparent absence of consultation before US military intercession and the president's own longing to shorten US military responsibilities and "country building" endeavours in the region. Dissimilar to the planned military exertion to help topple the Qaddafi routine, there has been a striking nonappearance of administration in sorting out a coordinated universal exertion to haul Libya out of its descending winding and put it in a way to political restructuring. Obama lamented thusly that he had not demanded a post-strife arranging as well fundamentally rehashing in Libya the arrangement disappointment of Bush in Iraq.⁵⁹ In Syria and Yemen, the Administration additionally looked back the forces of change in spite of some wavering in Syria and anxiety in Yemen. Even though the administration criticized Bashar Al-Assad for repressive measures when protests cracked the calm sphere of Syrian politics, however, it had a view that the ouster of Al-Assad might remove a strategic peace partner for Israel and lead to more chaos. In Yemen, the expressed US arrangement had unquestionably more to do with pie in the sky thinking than the truth on the ground. In any case, Washington's genuine vital enthusiasm for Yemen is the stability and security of Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf. Practically, the United States can only hope to hold al-Qa'ida under wraps there and to contain different types of chaos. The administration concentrated on Yemen as a security issue by attempting to take out Anwar al-Awlaki and components of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and it entirely encompassed the job of the US military on the ground.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷ Hillary Clinton, "Remarks With Spanish Foreign Minister Trinidad Jimenez After Their Meeting," Washington, D.C., January 25, 2011.

⁵⁸Daalder, Ivo,(2011), Libya-Nato Success Story., Atlantic Council, Washington D.C,
www.wired.com/danger/2011/10/predator-Libya

⁵⁹ David Remnick, "Going the Distance: On and Off the Road with Barack Obama," *New Yorker*, January 27, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/going-the-distance-2>.

The Obama approach represented somewhere around a halfway renewal of US democracy policy from its vexed state toward the end of the Bush years. Although Obama has somehow managed to reduce the harming relationship of democracy promotion with the Iraq war and with one-sided, forceful change for the most part while as yet pressing together dynamic prodemocracy tact in numerous spots. Nevertheless, democracy promotion was certainly not a noteworthy component of any of the priorities of Obama's foreign policy regardless of his rhetorical assertion at the United Nations of an overall responsibility that America will never falter in its endeavours to support the privilege of individuals wherever to decide their own fate. Obama's mixed record on democracy promotion in the Middle East suggests a troubled legacy. The administration has been shocked by advancements and has attempted to locate another balance in a radically modified scene. For one thing, it has neglected to back its proclaimed responsibility to help promising advances with the imperative assets and political sponsorship to guarantee that those changes were fruitful. For another, it has wavered in endeavours to help merge relative examples of overcoming adversity as different needs lingered. At last, it has regularly guided toward restoring heartfelt relations with pioneers who seem to line up with US approach interests however turned around advancement toward democracy. A key to democratization, human rights, has frequently been minimized or disregarded. The unevenness of Obama's attachment to democracy abroad is more a continuation of a decade-in length design than a change or withdrawal. Ronald Reagan's stalwart responsibility to freedom coexisted with a preserving relationship with US autocratic allies, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Suharto of Indonesia, and Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan and others in the Middle East. President Clinton's connection to supporting democracy in a globalizing world gave noteworthy reverence to economic also, security interests that kept friendly US relations with tyrannical regimes all through the Arab world furthermore, imperative parts of Central Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. George W. Bush's "Freedom Agenda" did not abrogate the basic of security synergy with Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf, the appreciated relationships with Gulf governments, and the easiness of going simple on different African despots sitting on oil or assisting with counterterrorism.⁶⁰

It is clear that in some countries the US supported democracy and democratic transitions and democratic regimes, while in other countries it supported autocratic regimes. An important question arises here: Which is the rule and which is the exception in US policy towards the Middle East? Timo Kivimaki contended that the United States has for the most part rewarded changes towards autocracy where as it rebuffed democratization.⁶¹ Although the author in this research may, to some extent, agree with Kivimaki argument; however, the author doesn't think it is a matter of reward and punishment. Kivimaki may reply by the case of Hamas, the democratically elected government in Gaza and the non-recognition of the US of Hamas as an elected government and listing Hamas as a terrorist organization. Although this example may support Kivimaki; however, the author thinks it is a matter of interest, where the US supports democracy when it is in harmony with its interests while turns a blind eye on autocracy to secure its interests. Under the G. W. Bush administration, (1.07 Polity Democracy Score) democratic regimes were supported compared to (6.05 Polity Autocracy Score) US supported interest related autocratic regimes, while under the Obama Administration (1.33 Polity Democracy Score) democratic regimes were supported compared to (5.63 Polity Autocracy Score) US supported interest related autocratic regimes. Moreover, Kivimaki argued that oil producer autocrats are more supported than human rights violator autocrats.⁶²

⁶⁰ Carothers, Thomas, *ibid.*

⁶¹ Kivimaki, Timo, (2013), *The United States and The Arab Spring*, Journal of Human Security, vol.(9), Issue (1), pp. 15-26.

⁶² *Ibid.*

Donald Trump: Democracy Promotion: The Abandoned Process

“America first” a policy emphasizes American nationalism, economic nationalism and non-interventionism as cornerstones of Trump’s foreign policy. Under President Trump US foreign policy in the Middle East has inspired a strong deviation from the conventional US foreign policy foundation for being inchoate, barely characterized and fanatically set on overturning his predecessors’, G.W. Bush and Barack Obama, approaches in the region.⁶³ With respect to US bolster for democracy abroad, Trump’s aims and activities are clear: he looks to move the United States from the expansive responsibility to effectively supporting democracy worldwide development. As a presidential candidate, Trump more than once flagged an absence of enthusiasm for or worry about infringement of democratic norms and rights in different nations, a solid hesitance to prioritize bolster in US foreign policy, and an appreciation for abusive strongmen, from Russia’s Vladimir Putin to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. The US presidents frequently develop friendly relations with chose autocratic leaders for different security and economic interests. However, Trump has moved with exceptional, energetic promptness, even excited, to grasp dictators, huge numbers of whom were recently treated somewhere around a fractional with utter disdain by the United States.⁶⁴ Trump’s absence of enthusiasm for universal democracy bolster is a vital piece of his bigger inconvenience with the long-standing US pledge to a worldwide liberal order. It fits with his scrutinizing of a global arrangement of unrestricted trade, core alliances, and major multilateral organizations, for example, the United Nations, and his more extensive conviction that the plain thought of a positive-whole way to deal with universal order is essentially a sucker’s game.⁶⁵ This inclination wasn’t apparent in Trump’s speeches only, but in his administration rhetoric as well. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, national security advisor, McMaster and US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, have expressed their willingness and inclination to reduce US concern about democracy and human rights.

In terms of actions, Trump rapidly puts a conclusion to Bush and Obama’s changes, realigning US policy closer to its past structure however with some basic changes of his own. Pronouncing that the US would now seek after “regional stability” as opposed to “Nation building, Trump has effectively upheld an improbable pivot of Israel, Iran and its state and non-state intermediaries and fighting terrorism.⁶⁶ On the Israeli-Palestinian front, US approach has been an unmitigated calamity, serving just to empower the conservative inclinations which are demonstrated in Trump’s refusal to underwrite the two-state arrangement, his legitimization of Israeli settlements, his slicing of help to Palestinians and his moving of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Regarding Iran, Trump has hauled out of the Iran atomic arrangement (formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA), an agreement the US concluded alongside the European Union, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom, and extreme approvals have been re-forced on Teheran. The Iran deal was an accomplishment of President Obama, and has more than once been taunted by Trump as “the worst deal ever.” Although Trump and his administration assured in their rhetoric and actions on fighting terrorism and defeating ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), with his decision to withdraw all US forces from Syria, President Trump directed a big blow to the US policy in the Middle East. Trump’s choice for all intents and purposes guarantees that security will deteriorate further, that the Islamic State and Iran will flood once more, and that the United States will be constrained to return into Syria at significantly more noteworthy military expense and in more unfriendly conditions than if we had remained, argued

⁶³ Al-Dajani, Rafat, (2018), Trump in the Middle East: A Year Two scorecard,

<https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/trump-middle-east-year-two-scorecard>

⁶⁴ Carothers, Thomas, 2017, **Democracy Promotion Under Trump: What Has Been Lost? What Remains?**<https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/09/06/democracy-promotion-under-trump-what-has-been-lost-what-remains-pub-73021>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Al-Dajani, Rafat, *ibid*

Victoria Nuland.⁶⁷

CONCLUSIONS

Throughout its history and throughout the subsequent American administration, democracy has been an essential part of the administration's rhetoric; however, democracy promotion has been selected or pursued on a case by case basis only when it is consistent with the US economic and security interests but lags behind when it isn't. The US democracy promotion efforts increased after the end of the Cold War era and as a reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union with a bigger involvement with transitions in post-communist European countries and post-Soviet Russia. After 9/11, G. W. The Bush administration considered democracy promotion as an essential mechanism to enhance national security by confronting and destroying fundamentalist ideologies responsible for creating extremism and terrorism in the world. For interest related reasons, democracy promotion funding increased, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan and the broader Middle East on the "Global War on Terror". With regards to anti-terrorism policy, the pledge to democracy promotion was tested by transient American enthusiasm for getting the cooperation of autocratic governments on immediate security concerns. This restored inquiries regarding the US consistency and duty to democracy and human rights prompted a recharged allegation of double standards. In extraordinary part as a response to what it saw as the exorbitant rhetoric and serious mistakes of the Bush years, the Obama administration established a reasonable move in rhetoric about, and bolster for, democratization. However, in reality it achieved no mentioned success as it was also conflated with US interests. The different fronts of Obama's long game are not interconnected parts and are not restructuring the world in the image of the United States. They are about the United States endeavouring to secure its security and economic prosperity despite different difficulties. The present US administration has shown a decisive shift from the long-dated US foreign policy which used democracy promotion as a tool of intervention to secure its interests to a business oriented foreign policy that totally discards the normative image of the US as the model of democracy and promoter of liberal democracy in the world.

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